By Von Benda-Beckmann, Bas
As one of many significant symbols of German discomfort, the Allied bombing battle left a powerful imprint on German society. to a wider quantity than is frequently claimed, the Allied bombings turned a part of German debates at the moment international conflict. In either the GDR in addition to the Federal Republic prior to and after 1990 the air conflict turned a subject of public and political curiosity in addition to the topic of many ancient bills. Bas von Benda-Beckmann analyzes the German historiography of the Allied bombings considering the fact that 1945. He explores how German historic money owed mirrored debates on post-war German id, and even if the heritage of the air battle shaped a "counter-narrative" opposed to the concept that the Germans as a collective have been accountable of the Nazi crimes. This identify should be previewed in Google Books - http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN9789056296537.
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Additional resources for A German Catastrophe?: German Historians and the Allied Bombings, 1945-2010
96 Rumpf against stated that these “retaliatory mea- 95 Ibid. 14, 21. Also see: Spetzler, Luftkrieg und Menschlichkeit 265-266 and the even more apologetic remarks by Albert Kesselring playing the role of a dispassionate historian: Kesselring, “Bilanz des zweiten Weltkrieges” 150. 96 The term “Baedeker attacks“ refers to the German attacks on British towns such as Bath, Exeter and Canterbury in April and May 1942. The term Baedeker refers to a German travel guide, to indicate that these British cities were selected for German “retaliation” because they were considered to be tourist highlights and not important strategic targets.
What is interesting here is that Feuchter wrote from a perspective that was very common among former Wehrmacht officers, who in the early postwar decades produced a series of memoirs. The underlying question in Feuchter’s book was why Germany had lost the war, and he concluded that the German decision not to develop a policy of “strategic bombing” had been a crucial factor in the German defeat. Feuchter distinguished clearly between the “honorable” army and its incompetent (Nazi) leaders. He contrasted the “honorable” German troops with their incompetent high command (by which he meant although he did not men52 tion by name such “Nazi bonzes” as Goering).
Also see: Grosse Kracht, Zankende Zunft 24-29. 37 Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe. Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen (Wiesbaden: 1946) 172-173. 38 Lorenz, “Twee soorten catastrofe”. As Robert Moeller and Norbert Frei have pointed out this master narrative corresponded with a general trend in official politics of the past to concentrate on the suffering and hardships the Germans had endured during the war, instead of on that of its victims. Moeller, War stories; Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik.
A German Catastrophe?: German Historians and the Allied Bombings, 1945-2010 by Von Benda-Beckmann, Bas